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Abstract
Task allocation problems have traditionally focused on cost optimization. However, more and
more attention is being given to cases in which cost should not always be the sole or major
consideration. In this paper we study a fair task allocation problem in transportation where
an optimal allocation not only has low cost but more importantly, it distributes tasks as even
as possible among heterogeneous participants who have different capacities and costs to execute
tasks. To tackle this fair minimum cost allocation problem we analyze and solve it in two parts
using two novel polynomial-time algorithms. We show that despite the new fairness criterion, the
proposed algorithms can solve the fair minimum cost allocation problem optimally in polynomial
time. In addition, we conduct an extensive set of experiments to investigate the trade-off between
cost minimization and fairness. Our experimental results demonstrate the benefit of factoring
fairness into task allocation. Among the majority of test instances, fairness comes with a very
small price in terms of cost.
Keywords: Task allocation; Fairness; Cost minimization; Algorithms.
1 Introduction
Traditionally, optimization of task allocation problems considered only the costs involved in the
allocation. However, there has been in recent years more attention to cases where cost should
not always be the sole consideration (Campbell et al. 2008). There are circumstances when other
criteria need to be taken into account as well during the decision making process. Fairness
has been considered as one of the important additional criteria in many application domains
(Ogryczak et al. 2005, Gopinathan and Li 2011, Bertsimas et al. 2012). Although there is no
common definition for the term, there are two fairness criteria that are often used in the literature:
the Nash bargaining criterion and the Rawlsian maximin criterion. The former is based on Nash’s
four axioms of pareto optimality, independency of irrelevant alternatives, symmetry, and invariance
to affine transformations or equivalent utility representations (Nash 1950). The latter is based on
Rawls’ two principles of justice (Rawls 1971). Rawls’ maximin criterion maximizes the welfare
level of the worst-off group member and has therefore been used in allocation problems (Jaffe
1981, Kumar and Kleinberg 2000).
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In this paper, we study task allocation problems in which we take fairness into account in addi-
tion to the standard minimum cost criterion. This work was inspired by an actual transportation
situation in the port of Rotterdam in the Netherlands. The increase in the number of container
terminals in the said port will result in a huge increase in inter-terminal transport (ITT). The port
authority invited a team of researchers to investigate a sustainable transportation system, called
an asset light solution, in which trucks that were already present in the port could execute open
jobs. The main idea behind this system is that trucks that come from the hinterland to drop off
or pick up containers often have spare time in between tasks. Usually, trucks are scheduled to do
several jobs to and from various terminals in the port in one day. There may be large gaps be-
tween these jobs during which time the truck would be idle due to the nature of the jobs that truck
companies agree to do. Terminals could take advantage of these idle trucks by providing them
with jobs that they can perform within the port while waiting for their next scheduled job. The
trucks will be compensated for these jobs. The compensation from the terminals to the trucking
companies would be large enough to cover the costs that the companies would incur. However,
the compensation should be less than the costs of purchasing and maintaining, or even renting
the vehicles dedicated for such jobs. This way, the trucking companies gain additional income
while the terminals save money by using readily available resources. Furthermore, because the
utilization rate of existing trucks becomes higher and no new trucks are needed, this is a more
durable approach to meeting the transport need within the port.
To realize such a task allocation, terminals need to be informed of the individual schedules
of the different trucking companies. This poses a hurdle because getting such information is
expensive and the trucking companies may be reluctant to share their entire schedules. One way
to circumvent this difficulty is to use auctions as a means to collect information from different
parties. Auctions have become increasingly popular for allocating resources among individual
players in many application domains, such as in spectrum auctions (Cramton 2002), health care
(Smits and Janssen 2008), industrial procurement (Gallien and Wein 2005, Bichler et al. 2006)
and logistics (Sheffi 2004, Ball et al. 2006). In the auction for our trucking task allocation case,
we assume that all terminals together act as an auctioneer and they announce a set of available
jobs. Different trucking companies can bid for those jobs, depending on their idle trucks at specific
times. Given the bids of different companies, the terminals then decide on a best allocation of
jobs to companies.1 Because there are ITT movements every day that need to be executed, this
task allocation activity would be held daily. Some studies have shown that greedily minimizing
cost does not fare well with repeated auctions. Participants could experience starvation in the
long run, which will reduce their incentive to continue participating in the allocation activity
(Gopinathan and Li 2011). Furthermore, repeated auctions may affect the relationships between
the auctioneer and bidders, which in turn affects the latter’s way of bidding (Jap and Haruvy
2008). To prevent these adverse effects, we should not only look at optimizing the costs in the
task allocation, but we should also incorporate fairness in the task allocation that results from
the auctions. We do this by reassuring that all interested parties will receive some market share,
1Auctions are used in this research as a way to collect local information from the participants. We do not consider
the bidding behaviour of the bidders in this paper.
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therefore giving trucking companies an incentive to continue participating in the task allocation
activity. As we do not know the exact utility functions of the players, the number of jobs allocated
to them will be used to measure the fair distribution of the utilities of the players.
We study a “max-min fair minimum cost allocation problem” (MFMCA). The majority of
existing work involving fairness uses mathematical programming models in which fairness is in-
corporated in either the constraints (Meng and Yang 2002, Perugia et al. 2011) or in the objective
function (Bertsimas et al. 2011b, 2012, Barnhart et al. 2012). However, we aim for a polynomial-
time solution. The difficulty of our problem lies in the additional fairness criterion, which requires
the developed algorithm to satisfy three criteria: allocation maximization, fairness, and cost min-
imization. To the best of our knowledge, no existing polynomial-time algorithm can be directly
applied to solve our problem. In this paper, we propose polynomial-time algorithms to solve
MFMCA as a two-level optimization problem. First, we aim at a fairest allocation among com-
panies while ensuring that a maximal set of tasks can be allocated for execution. We call this the
“max-min fair allocation problem” (MMFA). Second, because there might be an exponential num-
ber of allocations that are considered max-min fair, we would like to determine which of these fair
allocations has the lowest cost. The resulting allocation is max-min fair with minimum cost. To
this end, we develop a polynomial-time optimal method that consists of two novel algorithms: (1)
to solve MMFA, we construct an algorithm, called IMaxFlow, using a progressive filling idea in a
flow network (Bertsekas et al. 1987), and then (2) by using the solution obtained from MMFA, we
propose another algorithm, called FairMinCost, that smartly alters the structure of the problem
to solve MFMCA optimally.
The contribution of this paper is two-fold.
1. Despite the new fairness criterion, we are able to develop an optimization method to solve
the task allocation problem to optimality in polynomial time.
2. Using computational results, we provide insights into situations in which fairness can be
incorporated without giving up too much efficiency.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We start with a literature review in Section 2,
followed by a problem definition in Section 3. In Section 4, we introduce two polynomial-time algo-
rithms to solve MMFA and MFMCA, respectively. We prove that the output of these algorithms
is the optimal allocation in terms of fairness and cost minimization. In Section 5, using different
sets of scenarios, we test the algorithm in terms of its effect on the cost and job distribution. We
conclude and point out interesting directions of future work in Section 6.
2 Literature review
The idea of factoring fairness into decision making has been studied in various fields. One of
the earlier and still important areas of application where fairness has been considered is that of
bandwidth allocation in telecommunication networks (Jaffe 1981, Zukerman et al. 2005). In this
area, continuous flows with predefined origin-destination pairs are used, leading to algorithms that
increase flow over all paths simultaneously until links are saturated, or that split up bandwidth
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equally among competitors. Bertsekas et al. (1987) give a simple algorithm for computing max-
min fair rate vectors for flow control in networks, the so-called progressive filling algorithm, which
is treated as one of the standard fairness concepts within the telecommunications or network
applications (Ogryczak et al. 2005). In their problem setting, they assume that each session has
an associated fixed path in the network. The algorithm starts with no flow, and then flow gets
gradually increased over all paths simultaneously until a link in a path is saturated. The algorithm
then continues from step to step, equally incrementing the flow in all paths that are not using
saturated links, until all paths contain at least one saturated link. Tomaszewski (2005) provides
a general mathematical programming formulation for solving max-min fair problems using the
progressive filling algorithm. Although we cannot use these proposed solution methods directly,
we are able to borrow the idea of the progressive filling algorithm when developing our method
for solving MMFA.
Fairness, or equity, has also been incorporated in staff scheduling. They attempt to distribute
the workload fairly and evenly among personnel, where it is a typical strategy to construct cyclic
rosters (Ernst et al. 2004). The more popular measures for equity in this field are the variance
and variants of the Gini index. Equity is then incorporated in mathematical models in either the
objective function, e.g. minimizing the variation in workload, or through the use of constraints,
which provide lower and upper bounds on the workload (Eiselt and Marianov 2008). Resource
allocation is yet another field in which fairness plays an important role. An example of a very weak
fairness constraint in this field is that any task will be able to use its requested resource eventually.
A much stricter fairness requirement can be found in proportionate fairness (Baruah et al. 1996).
With proportionate fairness, the difference in the number of resource allocations to tasks will never
be more than one, ensuring that all tasks have similar access to resources. Dominant Resource
Fairness is another type of fairness requirement, which is a generalization of max-min fairness for
multiple resources, where it maximizes the minimum dominant share across all users (Ghodsi et al.
2011). Fairness influences the order in which resources are scheduled to tasks, as certain tasks
may take precedence.
Another domain in which fairness is incorporated is the field of air traffic management. In this
field, fairness is important for air traffic flow management (Lulli and Odoni 2007, Barnhart et al.
2012), flight scheduling (Kubiak 2009), and allocation of take-off and landing slots at airports
(Bertsimas et al. 2011b, 2012). These studies consider a fair distribution of the utilities of all
players usually expressed in monetary units or delay time. The air traffic flow management prob-
lem has been shown to be NP-hard (Bertsimas and Patterson 1998), and therefore mathematical
programming models are often used in which the fairness measurement is incorporated in the ob-
jective function with which good computational results are achieved (Bertsimas et al. 2011b, 2012,
Barnhart et al. 2012). In addition, Hoffman et al. (2005) and Kim and Hansen (2015) emphasize
that equity and fairness are important in the air traffic flow management program design, because
equitable treatment of airlines in such programs will be less likely to encourage gaming behaviour
by a highly competitive industry. If one fails to consider equity, it might be detrimental to an
otherwise well-designed air traffic flow management program. Ogryczak et al. (2014) provides a
nice overview of the various areas of application of fairness and the most important models and
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methods of fair optimization.
Surprisingly, fairness has not yet been investigated widely in transportation optimization prob-
lems, although it has been treated as a psychological factor that influences acceptability of policies
like road pricing (Fujii et al. 2004, Eriksson et al. 2008). In road network design fairness is also an
issue, because without fairness network users might not get any benefit from the network design
project, and therefore it may be difficult to rally public support and it may be easy to evoke oppo-
sition to the implementation of such a project (Meng and Yang 2002). In this application fairness
is enforced through the addition of a constraint on the difference of the travel cost ratio between
before and after the project. There has also been some work in vehicle routing problems, where
fairness is considered in the extra-time distribution of a transportation service (Perugia et al.
2011). In order to incorporate fairness, they make use of a capping function, which enforces an
upper bound on the extra-time. Litman (2002) gives an overview of many different transporta-
tion decisions where fairness could be incorporated. However, there is hardly any literature on
incorporating fairness in task allocation problems in transportation.
We use the number of tasks allocated to a player as our measure of fairness. Thus, fairness is
a property inherent in the allocation itself. We introduce a novel solution method because in our
problem we try to assign tasks to players without any information on the players’ utilities. This is
in contrast to Bertsimas et al. (2011a, 2012), who assume that one knows the utilities of players,
such that efficiency and fairness can be expressed as a function of the utilities. In addition, we
define our fairness measurement in terms of the allocation itself rather than in terms of some
characteristic of the consequence of the allocation. Examples of the latter are tardiness and delay
time, which are often used in air traffic flow management (Lulli and Odoni 2007, Bertsimas et al.
2011b, Barnhart et al. 2012). We will show that our fairness measurement simplifies the optimiza-
tion problem and that we are able to develop polynomial-time algorithms to find an optimal fair
allocation, which is highly desirable in practice.
3 Problem definition
We assume that the set of available tasks (or jobs) to be distributed is known in advance by the
central planner. For instance, in our motivating example, the terminals know a day in advance
which container vessels will arrive and how many containers they will need to handle. The ter-
minals are thus able to construct a schedule for their vehicles and cranes a day ahead, and this
schedule reveals the necessary inter-terminal transport movements. These inter terminal transport
movements are the jobs to be auctioned. We assume a set of time periods T , which consists of T
time periods. The set of jobs, denoted by J consisting of a total of J jobs, comes with an earliest
available time and a latest completion time for each job. We assume that jobs are independent.2
Each job can therefore be executed individually regardless of the execution of other jobs. We
define for each job ji ∈ J its possible starting time as a mapping: J × T 7→ {0, 1}. When it is
clear from the context, we abuse the notation and use jti to denote that job ji is available at time
period t ∈ T .
2The relaxation of this independence assumption will be discussed in Section 6.
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Once the set of jobs J together with their possible starting times has been made available, a
set of companies K, consisting of K companies, may bid on individual jobs. We do not consider
combinatorial bids in this paper. In addition to the selection of jobs that a company k ∈ K wishes
to perform, the company also needs to provide their available capacity ntk in time period t in
which it is able to perform the jobs. We assume that each job takes up one unit of capacity and
can be completed within one time unit. Furthermore, the company k needs to provide its desired
compensation (or cost), c(ji, k), for the bid job ji ∈ J . A bid, Bk, from a company k is thus a
tuple: 〈ck,nk〉, where ck is a set of costs c(j
t
i , k), which denote the compensation of performing
job ji at time t, and nk is a set of capacities n
t
k, which specify the capacity of company k at time
period t.
The focus of this research is on the design of task allocation algorithms, and not on the auction
design. Therefore, to illustrate our approach, we adopt a simple sealed-bid first-price auction
format, where terminals can announce their available tasks and each company could submit their
bids via, for example, a bidding website. In a sealed-bid first-price auction all bidders submit their
sealed bids simultaneously so that no bidder knows the bids of other participants and the winning
bidder pays the price they submitted. Once all bids from the bidding companies K have been
collected, which can be enforced by a time limit, the auctioneer then decides which companies get
to execute which jobs, that is, the auctioneer determines a task allocation pi : J ×T ×K 7→ {0, 1}.
An allocation is feasible if (1) each job is allocated to at most one time slot and to at most one
company, i.e., for each j ∈ J ,
∑
t∈T
∑
k∈K pi(j, t, k) ≤ 1; and (2) the number of jobs needed to
be executed at time t does not exceed the capacity at time t of the company to which those
jobs are assigned, i.e., for each k and t,
∑
j∈J pi(j, t, k) ≤ n
t
k. The companies then receive the
corresponding compensations specified in their bids for executing the assigned jobs. The focus of
this paper is on determining an optimal allocation pi of jobs to bidders. Following our motivating
example, there are three ordered objectives for a fair job allocation: (1) the number of allocated
jobs in pi is maximized, (2) the allocation is fair to the bidders, and (3) the total compensation
for executing the jobs is minimized.
Objectives 1 and 3 are rather straightforward given the context. For the fairness objective, we
use the notion of max-min fairness derived from Rawls’ fairness principle (Rawls 1971). The central
idea of max-min fairness is that the minimum utility of all bidders will have been maximized. In
this work, we use the number of allocated jobs as a measure of the bidders’ utility. In this way, we
do not need to worry about the companies’ actual utility functions, which they are likely unwilling
to share with the auctioneer and which are difficult to model.
Given a feasible allocation pi, let the number of allocated jobs be Z = |{ji : ji ∈ J , pi(ji, ·, ·) = 1}|.
Let ω = (ω1, . . . , ωK) denote the number of jobs ωk assigned to company k ∈ K in pi. We call
ω an allocation vector. Clearly, it holds that
∑
ωk∈ω
ωk = Z. Given Z jobs, there may exist
many possible allocations that distribute Z jobs to K companies. We call an allocation vector ω
Z-feasible if and only if ω can lead to a feasible allocation and
∑
ωk∈ω
ωk = Z.
The max-min fairness principle entails that given a total of Z jobs, the number of jobs for
any company cannot be increased by at the same time decreasing the number of jobs of the other
companies that have the same number of jobs or less. More formally, let ω be a Z-feasible vector,
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Time points 1 2 3 4 5
company k1 j1 : 20
company k2 j1 : 30 j2 : 40, j3 : 25
company k3 j1 : 10 j2 : 20, j3 : 20 j3 : 25, j4 : 25 j2 : 30, j4 : 20 j5 : 20
Table 1: The bids of three companies include desired jobs in each time period and their associated
costs. The capacity of all companies is assumed to be 1 for each time period.
and σ be a sorting operator in which the components of ω are sorted in nondecreasing order:
σ(ω)i ≤ σ(ω)j if ωi ≤ ωj. Let φ = σ(ω). We want to maximize the lexicographical minimum
in all Z-feasible allocation vectors φ. Intuitively speaking, we want to have an allocation that
distributes a set of jobs among the companies as evenly as possible.
Definition 1 (Max-min fairness). Given Z jobs to be distributed, we say a Z-feasible sorted
allocation vector φ is lexicographically greater than another Z-feasible sorted vector φ′ if there
exists a smallest index j (1 ≤ j ≤ K) such that φj > φ
′
j , and for index i, 1 ≤ i < j, it holds
that φi = φ
′
i. An allocation vector is max-min fair with regard to Z jobs if it is lexicographically
greater than any other Z-feasible vector.
We now use the following example to illustrate the three objectives of the job allocation prob-
lem.
Example 1. Suppose we have 5 jobs to be auctioned. The jobs can be done in the following time
periods: (j1 : j
1
1); (j2 : j
2
2 , j
4
2); (j3 : j
2
3 , j
3
3); (j4 : j
3
4 , j
4
4 ); (j5 : j
5
5). Three companies submit their bids,
as shown in Table 1. The first row in the table shows that company k1 bids on job j1 that is to be
executed during time period 1, for a compensation of 20.
In this example, all 5 jobs can be feasibly assigned. There are five feasible allocations: pi1
assigns j11 , j
2
2 to k2 and j
3
3 , j
4
4 , j
5
5 to k3; pi2 assigns j
1
1 to k1 and j
2
2 , j
3
3 , j
4
4 , j
5
5 to k3; pi3 assigns j
2
3 to
k2 and j
1
1 , j
2
2 , j
4
4 , j
5
5 to k3; pi4 assigns j
1
1 to k1, j
2
2 to k2 and j
3
3 , j
4
4 , j
5
5 to k3; and pi5 assigns j
1
1 to
k1, j
2
3 to k2 and j
2
2 , j
4
4 , j
5
5 to k3. The allocation vectors of these five assignments are φ1 = (0, 2, 3),
φ2 = φ3 = (0, 1, 4), and φ4 = φ5 = (1, 1, 3), respectively. In this example, we have two max-
min fair allocations: pi4 and pi5, because their allocation vectors φ4 and φ5, respectively, are
lexicographically greater than any other vectors derived from pi1, pi2, and pi3.
Concerning the third objective of the allocation, we notice that pi4 has a total compensation
of 125, while pi5 has a total compensation of 105. Thus, in this example, the optimal alloca-
tion that satisfies all three objectives is pi5 as it has the optimal max-min fairness with the least
compensation.
We now formally define the optimization problem that we study in this paper.
Definition 2 (Max-min fair minimum cost allocation (MFMCA) problem). Given a set of avail-
able jobs J with their possible starting times, suppose a set of valid bids B = {B1, . . . , BK} is
submitted by K bidders. Each bid Bk = 〈ck,nk〉 specifies for each bid job ji its starting time
and the desired compensation c(jti , k), together with the company’s capacity n
t
k for each time pe-
riod t ∈ T . The objective of the max-min fair minimum cost allocation problem is to find the
optimal feasible allocation piφf : J × T × K 7→ {0, 1}, such that the number of allocated jobs
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Z = |{ji : ji ∈ J , pi(ji, ·, ·) = 1}| is maximum, and the allocation leads to a max-min fairness vec-
tor φf with regard to Z jobs, with the least total compensation
∑
j∈J ,k∈K,t∈T ,piφf (j,t,k)=1
c(jti , k).
We treat MFMCA as a two-level optimization problem. First, we determine what allocation
is deemed max-min fair, and second, we determine which of the possibly many max-min fair
allocations has the lowest cost.
Definition 3 (Max-min fair allocation (MMFA) problem). The objective of the max-min fair
allocation problem is to find the optimal max-min fairness vector φf that indicates the maximum
number of jobs that can be assigned feasibly and that leads to a max-min fair allocation among all
bidders.
Given the output of the first-level optimization problem (MMFA), i.e., a max-min fairness
vector, we search for the allocation that gives the desired fair allocation and that has the lowest
total compensation.
4 Polynomial-time optimal algorithm for MFMCA
In this section, we introduce a two-stage network flow based polynomial-time algorithm to solve the
proposed MFMCA problem. In the first stage, we propose an iterative maximum flow algorithm,
called IMaxFlow, to enforce a fairest job distribution over companies while ensuring that the
maximal number of jobs can be allocated. The output of the IMaxFlow algorithm, i.e., the optimal
max-min fairness vector φf , is then used as input to the FairMinCost algorithm to construct a
new flow network. By any standard minimum-cost maximum-flow algorithm on this constructed
flow network, we prove that we obtain the optimal solution to MFMCA. In the next section we
present the proposed two-stage algorithm, starting with the iterative maximum flow (IMaxFlow)
algorithm.
4.1 IMaxFlow algorithm for solving MMFA
Given an instance of the MMFA problem, we can construct a network flow, and then apply the
proposed iterative maximum flow algorithm to obtain the optimal max-min fairness vector.
Suppose the set of available jobs is J . We want to build a flow network to push J from the
source node a to the sink node b. The flow network is a directed graph G = (V,A) with capacities
Cu,v for each (u, v) ∈ A. The flow network can be constructed from any problem instance of
MMFA by adding the following node layers and arcs from a to b: (1) First, we create a node layer
for the jobs J . Each job ji ∈ J of this job layer is connected with source node a. Because each
job only needs to be executed once, the capacity of these arcs is 1. (2) As each job has certain
time periods in which it can be executed, we construct another node layer next to the job layer
with job-time nodes jti for each available time period t for each job ji. The job-time nodes are
connected to their corresponding job nodes in the job layer with the arcs having a capacity equal
to 1, because a job can only be executed at most once in a certain time period. (3) From the
bids of the companies we know which companies bid on which jobs at which time periods with a
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1
j1J
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1
1
1
1
k1
1
kT
1
k1K
kTK
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1,1)
1 : c(j1
1,K)
1 : c(jT
1,1)
1 : c(jT
1,K)
1 : c(j1J,1)
1 : c(j1J,K)
1 : c(jTJ,1)
1 : c(jTJ,K)
k1
kK
n1k1
nTk1
n1kK
nTkK
b
C1,b = N1
CK,b = NK
Figure 1: A constructed flow network for solving MMFA, where j1, . . . , jJ represent a set of available
jobs, j11 , . . . , j
T
J are job-time nodes, k
1
1, . . . , k
T
K are company-time nodes, and k1, . . . , kK represent a set
of companies.
certain cost. Therefore, from these bids we can construct yet another node layer with company-
time nodes that indicate the time periods t in which each company k is available, denoted by kt.
These nodes are connected to the corresponding job-time nodes where the company made a bid
at that particular time period. These arcs each have a capacity of 1. However, unlike previously
created arcs, these arcs have costs associated with them equal to the corresponding compensations
indicated in the bids. These costs do not play a role in solving MMFA, as its objective is not
related to the cost. (4) Once we have constructed this company-time layer, we can construct
another node layer consisting of company nodes. Each node in this company layer corresponds to
a company k ∈ K. The company-time nodes in the company-time layer will then be connected
to their respective companies in the company layer to aggregate the former. These arcs have
a capacity ntk equal to the capacity that a company k has indicated as being available in that
particular time period t. Finally, we connect all nodes in the company layer with sink node b. For
each company k ∈ K the edge between its node and the sink has a capacity Nk =
∑
t∈T n
t
k, which
is the total capacity over all time slots. An example of the resulting flow network is illustrated in
Figure 1.
Given the constructed flow network G, the value of a flow f = f(a, b) is the total flow that can
be pushed from the nodes in the company layer to the sink node b, i.e., f =
∑
v∈{k1,...,kK}
f(v, b).
Hence, it is clear that the solution to the problem of finding the maximum flow given the translated
flow network problem is equivalent to finding the maximum number of jobs that can be allocated
to the companies in MMFA. Therefore, given an instance of the MMFA problem, if we run a
standard maximum flow algorithm on the constructed flow network G, we will obtain a solution
that tells us the maximum number of jobs that can be allocated.
However, the objective of the MMFA problem is also to find the optimal max-min fair solution.
Therefore, to solve this maximum flow problem with an additional fairness property, we introduce
an iterative maximum flow algorithm that applies the maximum flow algorithm, such as Edmonds-
Karp (Edmonds and Karp 1972), in a greedy fashion. In this way, the flow assigned to each
company is increased step by step until no more flows can be assigned. This idea is similar to the
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so-called progressive filling algorithm (Bertsekas et al. 1987). Our proposed iterative algorithm
IMaxFlow works as follows.
Initiation We construct a set Q that contains all companies and we set the capacity for all
companies to 0, which means that in G, the capacity on the arcs connecting the nodes k1, . . . , kK ∈
K in the company layer and the sink node b is set to 0, i.e., Ck,b = 0 for all k ∈ K in Figure 1.
Iterations In the first iteration I1, we arbitrarily pick a company kq ∈ Q and then increase
its capacity by 1, i.e., Ckq,b = Ckq,b + 1 = 1. We then run a standard maximum flow algorithm,
which returns a maximum flow f I1kq given the restricted capacities. We check whether kq receives
a flow, i.e., whether f I1(kq, b) = 1 is true. If f
I1(kq, b) = 0, then we can conclude that company
kq will not be allocated any job even if we would further increase its capacity. In this case, we
fix the capacity Cfkq,b of the edge between the sink and company kq to C
f
kq,b
= 1 − 1 = 0, and
remove company kq from set Q. If f
I1(kq, b) = 1, then we know that company kq can handle a
flow of 1, so we can let Ckq,b = 1 and continue. We then choose another company in Q and repeat
the above-mentioned process until we have done the same for all companies in Q. Recall that all
companies can get at most one job in this iteration because their capacity is set to 1.
We then start the next iteration I2. We arbitrarily pick a company kq ∈ Q and check whether
it has reached its total capacity. If so, we fix its capacity Cfkq,b = Ckq,b and remove kq from Q.
Otherwise, we increase its capacity to Ckq,b = Ckq,b + 1 = 2. We again run the maximum flow
algorithm on G with the updated capacity and obtain a maximum flow f I2kq . If the maximum
flow f I2kq is the same as the maximum flow obtained in the previous step (for the first company
in iteration I2, this is the flow at the end of the previous iteration, f
I1), we can conclude that
increasing the capacity Ckq ,b for company kq does not result in a larger flow. Therefore, we fix
the capacity Cfkq,b of the edge between the sink and company kq to C
f
kq,b
= 2− 1 = 1, and remove
company kq from Q. We repeat this for all other companies kq ∈ Q. For the subsequent companies
in the same iteration, we compare the flow obtained after running the maximum flow algorithm
on G with the maximum flow obtained in the previous step, which is f I2kq−1 . If the maximum flow
f I2kq is larger than the maximum flow obtained in the previous step, then we can let Ckq,b = 2 and
continue.
In this way, during iteration Ii we fix a company kq’s capacity to C
f
kq,b
= i − 1 in G, either
when the company does not receive more flow than in the previous step Ii,kq−1 (or Ii−1 if kq is
first in Ii), or when the company reaches its maximal total capacity, i.e., C
f
kq,b
= i− 1 = Nkq . In
each iteration we always add one more capacity to the company-sink edges whose capacities have
not been fixed.
Termination We iterate this process untilQ is empty, that is, when the flow no longer increases
with the addition of more capacities to the companies, or when the capacities of all the companies
have reached their limits. It also follows that the capacities of all the company-sink arcs are fixed
to some values.
We return the maximum flow f found upon termination as the maximum number of jobs that
can be allocated, and the fixed capacities Cfk,b. The fixed capacities C
f
k,b — equivalent to the
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number of flows on the company-sink edges, f(k1, b), f(k2, b), . . ., f(kK , b) — specifies the number
of jobs ωk1 , ωk2 , . . ., ωkK assigned to companies k1, . . . , kK . The fixed capacities C
f
k,b also comprise
the max-min fairness vector φf = σ(ω).
This iterative maximum flow algorithm is described in Algorithm 1. Note that this adapta-
tion is independent of the maximum flow algorithm used and is therefore suitable to be used in
combination with any existing maximum flow algorithm.
Algorithm 1 IMaxFlow algorithm for solving MMFA
Input: G = (V,A) a constructed flow network for an instance of MMFA, where a, b are the source
and sink node, respectively. The capacity of a company-sink edge is denoted as Ck,b for k ∈ K. Nk
denotes the maximum capacity of company k
Output: a maximum flow f and a max-min fair allocation vector φf
fcurr ← 0; fprev ← −1
Q = K; I = 0 {I denotes the iteration number}
C
f
k,b ← 0, ∀ k ∈ K {C
f
k,b denotes the final fixed capacity for company-sink edge e(k, b)}
Ck,b ← 0, ∀ k ∈ K {update G by setting capacities of company-sink edges to 0}
while Q 6= ∅ do
I = I + 1 {increase the iteration number by 1}
for each k ∈ Q do
fprev ← fcurr
if Ck,b < Nk then
Ck,b ← Ck,b + 1
Call maximum flow algorithm (MF) on G, fcurr ← MF(G)
if fcurr = fprev then
Ck,b ← Ck,b − 1; C
f
k,b ← Ck,b
Q ← Q \ {k}
end if
else
C
f
k,b ← Ck,b, Q ← Q \ {k}
end if
end for
end while
return fcurr as f , sorted (C
f
1,b, . . . , C
f
K,b) as φf
We illustrate IMaxFlow by the following example.
Example 2. Refer to the problem instance in Example 1. We can construct the accompanying
flow network as shown in Figure 2. The IMaxFlow algorithm first sets all the capacities of the three
companies — i.e., the edges e(k, b) connecting to sink b — to 0. Then it increases the capacity of
e(k1, b) by 1 and runs the maximum flow algorithm, which obtains f(k1, b) = 1. This is repeated
for each company. At the end of the first iteration we have f I1(k1, b) = f
I1(k2, b) = f
I1(k3, b) = 1,
and the total maximum flow is f I1 = 3. This can be achieved by pushing a flow from j1 to k1, a
flow from j2 to k2, and a flow from j3 to k3.
During the second iteration, Cfk1,b is fixed to 1 as k1 has reached its highest capacity and
f I2k1 = f
I1 = 3. Next, the capacity of e(k2, b) is set to 2. After running a standard maximum
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Figure 2: The constructed flow network given the problem instance described in Example 1. The
capacities of the arcs in the flow network are 1, except for the arcs between the company nodes kk and
the sink b. The numbers on the edges between the job-time nodes jti and the company-time nodes k
t
k
specify the compensations of company k performing job ji at time period t. We do not take these costs
into account in MMFA.
flow algorithm, we have a maximum flow f I2k2 = 3, because k1 and k2 together can be assigned two
jobs (either j1, j2 or j1, j3) and k3 receives one job because its capacity is still 1. As f
I2
k2
= f I2k1 ,
increasing k2’s capacity does not help to increase the flow but may harm the fairness because it
may happen that both j1, j2 (or j1, j3) can be allocated to k2. Hence, we fix k2’s capacity C
f
k2,b
to
1. We then look at the case where the capacity of e(k3, b) is increased to 2. It is clear that f
I2
k3
is
now 4.
Thus, we continue with iteration 3, where we only increase k3’s capacity to 3. After running
IMaxFlow, we have a flow of 5, with a possible allocation of j1 to k1, j3 to k2, and j2, j4, j5 to k3.
As increasing k3’s capacity will not increase the flow any further, C
f
k3,b
is fixed to 3, and
the algorithm terminates. The maximum number of allocated jobs is 5, with a max-min fairness
vector of φf = (1, 1, 3), which is simply the fixed capacity of each company-sink edge sorted in
nondecreasing order. 
We now prove that IMaxFlow is correct, that is, the returned flow value f is the maximum
number of jobs that can be allocated, and the returned fairness vector φf is the most fair job
distribution over the participating companies given f .
Theorem 1. IMaxFlow allocates the maximum number of jobs to the companies and returns a
sorted allocation vector that is max-min fair.
Proof. We will prove by induction that given a set of companies K, at any iteration Ii of the
algorithm IMaxFlow, given the available capacities of K, the returned flow f Ii is maximum, and
the sorted allocation vector is max-min fair among all f Ii-feasible vectors.
Base case: All companies start with capacity 0. In the first iteration I1 of IMaxFlow, one
company k ∈ K is arbitrarily picked and assigned a capacity of 1. Then we run the maximum flow
(MF) algorithm, which determines the maximum flow of the network given the current available
capacity. If this added capacity did not increase the total flow, k’s capacity is fixed to 0. At
the end of iteration I1, when the last company is given a capacity of 1 and the maximum flow
algorithm is run, it is clear that the returned flow f I1 is maximum given the total capacity of K.
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Let K0 be the set of companies whose capacities have been fixed to 0 during this iteration. Then
the sorted allocation vector is
φfI1 = (0, . . . , 0,︸ ︷︷ ︸
|K0|
1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
K−|K0|
).
It is possible that the set K0 is not unique. For example, a flow can be pushed either through
j’s node or k’s node. If we pick j first to increase the capacity and to test the flow, then later
increasing k’s capacity to 1 will not increase the total flow and hence k’s capacity will be fixed to
0, i.e., k ∈ K0. On the other hand, if we pick k earlier than j, we will have j ∈ K0. This situation
however gives us the same sorted vector of two companies, which is (0, 1). Thus, the first iteration
of the algorithm may result in a different set K0, but the size of K0 is always the same and the
total number of flows f I1 that can be pushed is always maximum. Therefore, the resulting sorted
allocation vector is the same for all possible f I1-feasible vectors, and it is max-min fair. Thus the
statement holds for the first iteration I1.
Induction step: Suppose the statement is true for iteration Ii, that is, after this iteration, the
returned flow f Ii is maximum given the total capacity added, and the sorted allocation vector
φfIi is max-min fair. Let φfIi be
φfIi = (C
f
1,b, . . . , C
f
m,b,︸ ︷︷ ︸
fixed
i, . . . , i︸ ︷︷ ︸
K−m
).
In φfIi , suppose there are m company-sink edges with fixed capacities C
f
h,b, 1 ≤ h ≤ m. We
denote these companies as Kfix. For the remaining unfixed K −m company-sink edges, according
to the algorithm, the amount of flow must be equal to their assigned capacity on iteration Ii,
which is i. Hence, we have for Ii the maximum flow f
Ii =
∑
h∈Kfix
Cfh,b + i× (K −m).
Now we need to show the statement stays true for iteration Ii+1. During this iteration, each
company j /∈ Kfix, who does not have a fixed capacity, is assigned one more capacity to have a
total capacity of i + 1. Let j /∈ Kfix be the first company to increase the capacity. After running
the MF algorithm, the returned maximum flow is either f Ii or f Ii +1, corresponding to the cases
that j will receive either i flow or i + 1 with an extra capacity. If j receives i flow, it is because
either its original capacity Nj = i or only i flow can be pushed along the job nodes to company j’s
node. At the end of iteration Ii+1, all companies not in Kfix have been given one more capacity
and have been tested with the MF algorithm. Assume L companies not in Kfix will be assigned
i+1 flows after iteration Ii+1. Then the total flow f
Ii+1 = f Ii +L is maximum given the capacity
of this iteration, as f Ii is maximum at iteration Ii. The resulting sorted allocation vector is
φ
fIi+1
= (Cf1,b, . . . , C
f
m,b,︸ ︷︷ ︸
m
i, . . . , i,︸ ︷︷ ︸
K−m−L
i+ 1, . . . , i+ 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
L
).
Similar to the reasoning for the base case of iteration I1, these L companies could be different
depending on the ordering of adding one extra capacity and testing. However, the sorted allocation
vector for the companies in Kfix is always the same, i.e, (i, . . . , i,︸ ︷︷ ︸
K−m−L
i+ 1, . . . , i+ 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
L
). Together with the
fact that φfIi is max-min fair in the previous iteration Ii, we have shown that φfIi+1 is max-min
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fair among f Ii+1-feasible allocation vectors.
Conclusion: By the principle of induction, it follows that the preceding statement is true for any
iteration of the algorithm IMaxFlow.
Hence, it follows that after the final iteration IMaxFlow returns the maximum number of jobs
to the companies and the sorted allocation vector is max-min fair.
As a by-product of the above reasoning, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 1. IMaxFlow returns a unique max-min fair allocation vector, given the maximum number
of allocated jobs.
Finally, we show that the proposed algorithm is a polynomial-time algorithm (see A for the
proof).
Theorem 2. The IMaxFlow algorithm runs in time O((J3K3T 3) + (J2K4T 3)).
4.2 FairMinCost algorithm
Once we know the fairness vector from IMaxFlow, we want to minimize the associated cost (com-
pensations). Because there are many feasible max-min fair maximum flow solutions with different
costs, we want to find the one with the minimum cost. Unfortunately, we cannot apply a standard
minimum-cost maximum-flow algorithm to our flow network as it may violate the max-min fair-
ness condition while looking for the minimum cost. The obtained fairness vector tells us in what
quantities the jobs will be distributed in the fairest allocation. However, we do not know which
company would be assigned which number of jobs such that the total cost is smallest.
If we know the exact number of jobs all companies would get, MFMCA is easily solvable using
a minimum-cost maximum-flow algorithm. This is obvious because we can set the capacities of
the arcs from the company nodes to the sink to be equal to the number of jobs of the respective
companies. Since we know from MMFA that the flow is maximal and feasible, and that the
capacities sum up to this maximum flow, we know that all jobs will be assigned. This boils down
to a simple minimum-cost maximum-flow problem that can be solved using any of the existing
algorithms.
However, if the exact number of jobs that all companies will get is not known, then the capacity
for each company can be any of the capacities in the fairness vector. This leaves us with many ways
to construct the flow network because it is assumed that the capacity of the arcs in a minimum-cost
maximum-flow problem are known. We can deal with this problem in several ways.
One way to find the minimum cost among all possible max-min fair allocations is to simply
enumerate all possible max-min fair allocations and solve a minimum-cost maximum-flow problem
for each of them, and then to finally choose the allocation that has minimum cost. However, this
method would be computationally inefficient, because it can be viewed as a multiset permutation
with
(
p
r1,r2,...,rp
)
= p!
r1!r2!...rp!
possibilities, where p =
∣∣φUf
∣∣, in which φUf denotes the vector of unique
capacities in φf , and ri denotes how often capacity i appears in φf , ri =
∑
k∈K
∣∣φf (k) = i
∣∣. For
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each possibility, we would need to run a minimum-cost maximum-flow algorithm. The resulting
running time would be exponential.
Instead, in this paper we propose an algorithm that makes variable capacities on arcs in the flow
network possible. Given the fairness vector φf = (φ1, . . . , φK), we introduce a solution method
that runs in polynomial time. To this end, we adjust the network flow model such that the fair
job distribution (φ1, . . . , φK) will be intact at the same time that cost minimization takes place.
The challenge is to somehow enforce the capacities of the fairness vector obtained from IMaxFlow
in the final allocation.
For ease of explanation, we denote an instance of the original MFMCA problem as P =
〈J ,K,T ,B〉. We now introduce a new problem P ′ = 〈J ′,K′,T ′,B′〉 adapted from P . The key
construction of P ′ given P is that we will update the original set of jobs J to J ′ = J ∪ J d,
where J d is a set of dummy jobs. Each dummy job provides a flow of 1 and has a cost of 0.
These dummy jobs will be performed during dummy time periods T d, thus, T ′ = T ∪ T d. The
set of companies K′ in P ′ stays the same as in the original problem P , i.e., K′ = K, however, they
have capacities at dummy periods T d for performing dummy jobs J d. The number of dummy
jobs and dummy periods will be determined by the fairness vector φf = (φ1, . . . , φK) returned
by the IMaxFlow algorithm on the instance of P . We construct a flow network G′ for problem
P ′ based on the constructed flow network G for an instance of problem P by adding the dummy
jobs and dummy times in G. In addition, we update the capacities of all companies to φK . After
completing G′, we claim that if we run a standard minimum cost, maximum flow algorithm on
G′, the solution is a fair minimum cost job allocation for the original problem P . We denote this
procedure as the FairMinCost algorithm.
Construction of G′. We first show how we can construct a flow network G′ for problem P ′
based on the constructed flow network G for an instance of problem P . Given G, we will add a
number of so-called horizontal dummy layers (DL for short). We have a dummy layer for each
increment of 1 from the lowest number of jobs, φ1, to the highest, φK . Hence, the total number
of DL is equal to the difference between the lowest and the highest number of jobs in the fairness
vector φf , i.e., there are φK −φ1 dummy layers: DL1,DL2, . . . ,DLφK−φ1 . Each layer is meant to
provide dummy jobs to companies such that all companies can have jobs up to a specified number.
We associate each dummy layer to the specified number in φf , that is, DL1 is associated with
number φ1 +1, DL2 with φ1 +2, and DLφK−φ1 with φ1 + (φK − φ1) = φK . In each dummy layer
DLl, we create a set of dummy job nodes J
d
l in the job layer of the network equal to the number
of companies that have a lower capacity than φ1 + l in the fairness vector φf . These dummy jobs
dl,i ∈ J
d
l are connected with source node a. We assume that each dummy layer DLl has its own
unique dummy time t′l and all dummy jobs from DLl need to be executed at time t
′
l. Thereafter,
we create dummy job-time nodes d
t′
l
l,i in the job-time layer for each dummy job dl,i ∈ J
d
l , and
connect them with their corresponding dummy job nodes dl,i. We assume that every company in
K′ is capable of performing every dummy job in J d, but that for each dummy time t′l the capacity
of every company is 1. Thus, for each dummy layer DLl, we create dummy time-company nodes
kt
′
l in the time-company layer for each company k ∈ K′ and connect them with all dummy job-time
nodes in that particular dummy layer DLl. Finally, we connect the dummy time-company nodes
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Figure 3: Minimum-cost maximum-flow network with dummy jobs for problem P ′ for the problem
instance described in Example 1. All arcs in the added dummy layers have a cost of 0 and a capacity
of 1.
ktl to the company nodes k in the company layer of the flow network G. All added arcs have
a cost of 0 and a capacity of 1. Finally, we change the capacities of the arcs from the company
nodes k to the sink b in G to the largest number according to the fairness vector, i.e., φK .
By creating nodes for each company per dummy layer, we are making sure that each company
can be assigned at most one dummy job in each dummy layer. Therefore, each company is able
to get any of the capacities in the fairness vector and it is not predetermined which companies are
assigned which capacity. This is exactly the flexibility we desire.
Example 3. In Example 1, we obtained a fairness index of φf = (1, 1, 3), and we showed the
constructed flow network G in Figure 2. We now show how to add dummy layers to G for this
instance in order to obtain G′. Figure 3 shows the final construction.
Given φf = (1, 1, 3), we have to create (3 − 1) = 2 dummy layers. In the first dummy layer
DL1 we create two dummy jobs d1,1 and d1,2 for the companies that have capacity 1 in order for
each of them to reach a capacity of 2. We then connect these two dummy jobs to the same dummy
time t′1. Thereafter, we create three dummy company-time nodes that are connected to the two
dummy job-time nodes and to the three company nodes. The capacity of each arc is 1. This means
that every company is able to do any of the dummy jobs during dummy time t′1 but that only one
dummy job from the same dummy layer can be assigned to the same company due to capacity
constraints. Subsequently, we use a similar construction for the second dummy layer DL2. In this
layer we again need to create two dummy jobs because there are two capacities smaller than 3 in
φf . The cost of all added edges is 0. After creating DL2, we change the capacities of the arcs
between the companies to the sink node from (1, 2, 5) to (3, 3, 3). 
Finding minimum-cost maximum-flow. Given the constructed network G′, all edges have
a cost cost(e(u, v)) of 0, except the edges between the original job-time nodes and the original
company-time nodes. We then run any existing (polynomial-time) minimum-cost maximum-flow
algorithm on G′ that is constructed for problem P ′. The solution is a flow f ′ satisfying f ′ =
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argminu′,v′∈V ′ cost(e(u, v))f
′(u, v), and f ′(k) is the number of allocated jobs to company k ∈ K.
Let pi′k denote the set of jobs assigned to k. After removing the dummy jobs in pi
′
k, i.e., pik =
pi′k \ {d | d ∈ J
d}, we obtain pik that is a set of real jobs in J assigned to company k. Then the
allocation vector (pik1 , . . . , pikK ) represents an optimal max-min fair allocation with the least costs,
which is the solution to the original problem P .
To summarize, given an instance P of the problem MFMCA, we use the IMaxFlow algorithm
to obtain a max-min fair allocation vector φf . Algorithm FairMinCost then constructs an instance
P ′, built upon the flow network of P , by adding a set of dummy nodes and arcs determined by
φf . We then run an existing polynomial-time minimum cost maximum flow algorithm on the flow
network of P ′. In the resulting flow, we remove the dummy jobs and dummy flows. Our running
example demonstrates how the algorithm works.
Example 4. We run an existing minimum cost maximum flow algorithm on the flow network for
problem P ′ (see Figure 3) constructed in Example 3. The job allocation pi′ for problem P ′ is: k1
is assigned {j11 , d1,1, d2,1}, k2 is assigned {j
2
3 , d1,2, d2,2}, and k3 is assigned {j
2
2 , j
4
4 , j
5
5}. All dummy
jobs are assigned, and the allocation vector is (3, 3, 3). The total cost is 105. We now remove all
dummy jobs from pi′ in order to obtain the solution pi to the original problem P . We then have:
j11 to k1, j
2
3 to k2 and j
2
2 , j
4
4 , j
5
5 to k3. The fairness vector of pi is φf = (1, 1, 3), which is max-min
fair, obtained from the algorithm IMaxFlow as illustrated in Example 2. The total cost of pi is 105
as dummy jobs have no cost. This is the same as the optimal max-min fair allocation in Example
1. 
We now claim FairMinCost is correct, i.e., the final flow returned by the FairMinCost algorithm
gives us an optimal solution to P with a max-min fairness vector φf and has the lowest cost given
φf .
Theorem 3. The FairMinCost algorithm returns an optimal solution of instance P for MFMCA.
The proof is given by the following two lemmas.
Lemma 2. The fairness vector obtained from solving problem P ′ by the FairMinCost algorithm
is the max-min fairness vector φf returned as an optimal solution to MMFA.
Proof. Let φf = (φ1, φ2, . . . , φK) be the nondecreasingly ordered capacities for the companies in
the fairness vector of the optimal solution of MMFA. Hence in an optimal solution to P , the
allocation vector is also φf . In problem P
′, the capacities are set to φ′ = (φK , φK , . . . , φK), as we
add φd = (φd1, φ
d
2, . . . , φ
d
K) = (φK − φ1, φK − φ2, . . . , φK − φK) capacity for the dummy jobs.
We show that in the allocation of the optimal solution of problem P ′, each company k ∈ K will
be assigned exactly φdk dummy jobs by any minimum cost maximum flow algorithm. We first note
that all dummy jobs will be allocated because there is sufficient capacity added to the network to
account for the dummy jobs and they have a cost of zero.
We will show that any company i ∈ K cannot get assigned more than φdi dummy jobs. Let
i = 1 be the first company in the sorted allocation vector, i.e., it has the most dummy capacity.
For company 1, its allocated dummy jobs cannot be more than φd1, simply because there are in
total φK − φ1 = φ
d
1 dummy layers in G
′ and any company can only get at most one job from each
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dummy layer. Take an arbitrary company i, 2 ≤ i ≤ K, WLOG, suppose company i is assigned
φdi +1 dummy jobs. This extra one dummy job has to come from another company j (j < i) who
has more dummy capacity than i. Hence, j, j < i, should receive φdj − 1 dummy jobs. If j still
gets φdj dummy jobs, it blocks the possibility for i to receive one extra dummy job as there will
be not a sufficient number of dummy jobs in the dummy layers to support this allocation, due to
the construction of dummy jobs in dummy layers.
Now, if φdj , j < i, will decrease, then there are two possibilities. First, if 0 ≤ φ
d
j − φ
d
i ≤ 1,
then φd will not change as it will retain its order. Second, if φdj − φ
d
i ≥ 2, then this will result in
a more even distribution of dummy jobs over companies. However, since φf = φ
′ − φd, this will
result in a more even, or in other words, fairer distribution of jobs in φf . This contradicts our
claim that φf is max-min fair. The same reasoning holds if we decrease φ
d
i , for i = 1, . . . ,K − 1
due to symmetry. If we decrease φdi , our only option is to increase a φ
d
j , j < i, which, as we have
seen before, cannot occur due to insufficiently available dummy jobs.
Lemma 3. The optimal solution for problem P in terms of cost is the same as the optimal solution
for problem P ′.
Proof. Assume that the cost of the allocation of jobs in P ′ is different than in P . If the allocation
in P ′ has a lower cost than the allocation in P , then because the dummy jobs have a cost of zero
and we have added sufficient capacity, we can remove the dummy jobs and obtain an allocation
for P that has a lower cost than the optimal allocation in P . This contradicts the assumption that
the allocation in P is optimal. Now if the allocation in P ′ has higher costs than the allocation
in P , then we can add dummy jobs to the optimal allocation in P and increase the capacities
accordingly so that we obtain problem P ′. We will then have an allocation for P ′ that has a lower
cost than the optimal allocation previously found in P ′. This contradicts the assumption that the
allocation in P ′ is optimal. Therefore, the cost of the optimal allocation of jobs in P is the same
as the cost of the optimal allocation in P ′.
We now show the running time complexity of the proposed FairMinCost algorithm. After
constructing the updated graphG′, we use a standard solution method for minimum cost maximum
flow problems, namely the cycle-cancelling algorithm. Given a feasible flow, the cycle-cancelling
method tries to find a negative cycle in the residual graph whose residual capacity it increases,
so that the negative cycle disappears and the resulting solution is a solution with lower costs.
Instead of choosing an arbitrary negative cycle, the cycle with the minimum mean cost is chosen,
which makes the problem strongly polynomial-time solvable (Goldberg and Tarjan 1989). In order
to find minimum mean-cost cycles, we use Karp’s algorithm (Karp 1978). This will give us our
desired solution in which we have an allocation that is max-min fair and has minimum cost among
all possible max-min fair allocations.
The runtime complexity of the FairMinCost algorithm is given below (see B for the proof).
Theorem 4. The FairMinCost algorithm runs in time O(J3K3(K+T )3(JK+JT+KT )2 log(JK+
JT +KT )).
18
As a conclusion, we can optimally solve MFMCA in polynomial time using first the IMaxFlow
algorithm and then the FairMinCost algorithm.
5 Computational results
In this section we investigate the performance of the algorithms through numerical experiments.
We are interested in the following two performance measurements:
1. The effect of fairness on the cost, the so-called price of fairness (POF) (Bertsimas et al.
2011a). POF is defined as the relative increase in the total cost (TC) under the fair solution,
compared to the minimum cost (MC) solution; that is,
POF =
TC(MFMCA)− TC(MC)
TC(MC)
.
2. The effect of fairness on the job distribution. The job distribution depicts the number of
jobs assigned to each company.
Therefore, we generate test cases with various parameters and compute both the minimum
cost solution (MC) using the standard minimum mean-cost cycle-cancelling algorithm, and the
fair minimum-cost solution using the two-stage algorithm: first IMaxFlow, and then FairMinCost.
Next to the costs, we take a look at the allocations in both cases and see how fairness influences the
allocation. All algorithms are coded in Java with the support of the JGraphT library (JGraphT
2014). We run the experiments on the Lisa Compute Cluster of SURFsara (SURFsara 2014).
5.1 Test instances
We derive test instances from our motivating example. In order to make the experiments repre-
sentative of the situation at the Rotterdam port, we need representative values for the different
parameters. First of all, we define one time unit as one hour, just as in the port. Although
some tasks require more time than others, a task from one end of the port to the other does not
take more than one hour due to the layout of the port. We choose a time window of 10 time
periods, t1, . . . , t10, corresponding to a typical working day. We then set the number of jobs to
250 (Duinkerken et al. 2006), and the number of companies to 50, based on the members of the
“VZV” (Verenigde Zeecontainer Vervoerders), the Dutch alliance of sea-container carriers, which
represents the different carriers in meetings with the terminals, the port, and other entities.
The jobs have a latest completion time. This is set to 3 time periods after the earliest time the
job becomes available. This means that if a job becomes available at the beginning of t1, it can
be started at t2 and t3 as well but not at t4, as its latest completion time was at the start of t4.
Jobs are distributed over the 10 time periods but not uniformly. Since there are two peak hours
throughout the day (Duinkerken et al. 2006), we configure jobs to have a 25% chance of starting
at t2 and another 25% chance of starting at t6. If a job would not specifically start at a peak hour,
it has an equal chance to start at any time period from t1 to t8. This ensures that each job has a
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time window of 3 in which it can be executed. This also ensures that the number of jobs available
in the first and last two time periods are smoothed out.
Scenarios. In our experiments we assign each company a certain probability to bid on each job
at an available time period. We distinguish three different scenarios. The first scenario is when
all companies are not very eager to bid on jobs or they do not have many trucks available. In this
low competition scenario there is a 25% chance of a company bidding on a job, for all companies,
for all jobs. The second scenario is the exact opposite: companies are actually eager to bid on
the jobs or they have many trucks available. In this high competition scenario there is a 75%
chance of bidding on a job. In the third scenario we combine the first two scenarios by splitting
up the companies into two groups of equal size, where the companies in the first group have low
competition, and the companies in the second group have high competition. This case is more
representative of reality, as there will be large companies that have plenty of trucks available, and
there will also be smaller companies that only have a few trucks available. We call this the mixed
competition scenario.
The number of trucks all companies will have available at a certain time period, the capacity,
will be drawn uniformly random between 0% and 5% (5% capacity) or between 0% and 10% (10%
capacity) of the total number of jobs they bid on in that particular time period, rounded to the
nearest integer. Furthermore, we ensure that companies will have at least one truck available when
they have bid on at least one job. Note that due to the dependency on the number of jobs they
bid on in a time period, low competition companies will have fewer trucks available at a certain
time period because they bid on fewer jobs, whereas high competition companies will have more
trucks available because they bid on more jobs.
Now that we know how companies will bid on jobs, the question remains how much they will
bid. We will have two cases here. The first case is when all companies have their bid drawn from
the same distribution. We choose a uniform distribution that ranges from 30 to 60. We choose
this range because the hourly wage of a truck driver plus the fuel costs for the largest distance
within the port amounts to roughly 30 euros. Because companies would like to make some profit
with these extra jobs, we let the bids range up to 60. We call this cost scenario the homogeneous
costs case and this can be applied to all three aforementioned bidding scenarios. The second case
is when some companies decide to bid relatively low while others decide to bid relatively high.
In the cases of low and high competition, half of the companies will have their bids drawn from
a uniform distribution that ranges from 30 to 50 and the other half from 40 to 60. When there
is mixed competition, the low competition companies will bid high, from 40 to 60, whereas the
high competition companies will bid low, from 30 to 50. The thought behind this is that low
competition companies value their trucks more than the high competition companies do. Low
competition companies only have a few trucks available and thus can only bid on a few jobs,
whereas the high competition companies have more trucks available and will bid on more jobs.
Therefore, the high competition companies will have to compete with many others for the same
jobs, and so they will offer lower prices. We call this cost scenario the heterogeneous costs case.
To summarize, we have six scenarios in total, each with 50 companies, 250 jobs, and a time
window of 3 time periods for a job:
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1. Low competition, homogeneous costs (low/hom).
2. Low competition, heterogeneous costs (low/het).
3. High competition, homogeneous costs (high/hom).
4. High competition, heterogeneous costs (high/het).
5. Mixed competition, homogeneous costs (mix/hom).
6. Mixed competition, heterogeneous costs (mix/het).
Out of these six scenarios, we believe the last scenario with heterogeneous companies and
heterogeneous costs to be the most interesting, because it comes closest to the real situation at
the port. We also expect this scenario to yield a relatively bad performance in terms of price of
fairness, because in the minimum cost solution most jobs will be allocated to the companies with
high competition and low costs. However, because we want to enforce fairness, we need to also
allocate jobs to the companies with low competition and high costs, which may increase the total
cost substantially.
For each scenario, we run 100 experiments with both the minimum mean-cost cycle-cancelling
algorithm for a minimum-cost solution and the fair two-stage algorithm for a fair solution. We
record the job allocations in both solutions and the difference in total cost between the minimum-
cost solution and the fair solution.
In the end we will investigate the effect of the amount of jobs and companies on the solutions.
One can imagine that the price of fairness will differ depending on the number of jobs that needs
to be allocated. To test this, we run experiments with 50 to 500 jobs in increments of 50, while
maintaining all other parameters. In the same vein, the price of fairness may be dependent on the
number of companies present. When there are only a few companies present the allocation may
lack flexibility, whereas having many companies might drive up the costs because more companies
have to be allocated a number of jobs. Therefore, we run experiments with 25 to 100 companies
in increments of 25, while keeping the other parameters the same as in the base case.
5.2 Results: price of fairness
We first present the results of the fair allocations compared to the minimum-cost allocations for
the experiments with all six scenarios. In Figures 4 and 5, the average price of fairness over
100 experiments per scenario, with 5% capacity and 10% capacity, respectively, are shown in a
boxplot. Tables 2 and 3 show the accompanying statistics, i.e., the mean, standard deviation, and
the minimum and maximum.
It is clear that costs play an important role in the differences in the total cost between
the minimum-cost and fair solutions. In the scenario with homogeneous costs (i.e., low/hom,
high/hom, mix/hom), the price of fairness ranges from 0 to 2.42. However, in the scenarios with
heterogeneous costs (i.e., low/het, high/het, mix/het) the price of fairness ranges from 0 to a
staggering 17.27. This is as expected, because if the costs are similar for all jobs for all companies,
it will be relatively easy to reallocate jobs to a different company with similar costs. Once costs
vary more among companies there will be an increase in costs because jobs that were allocated to
relatively cheap companies are forced to be reallocated to more expensive companies.
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Figure 4: Boxplot of the price of fairness with 5% capacity, with the different scenarios and the price
of fairness on the horizontal and vertical axes, respectively.
low/hom low/het high/hom high/het mix/hom mix/het
Min-cost mean 6477.97 7362.67 7515.21 7539.31 7559.42 7537.85
std 355.28 424.07 4.06 8.41 8.20 8.11
min 5585 6236 7506 7522 7535 7250
max 7335 8417 7526 7560 7579 7564
Fair mean 6483.29 7367.40 7516.45 8752.90 7658.93 8578.70
std 358.25 425.22 4.52 4.12 28.23 51.025
min 5582 6245 7506 8732 7602 8403
max 7385 8417 7529 8760 7743 8695
POF mean 0.08 0.06 0.02 16.10 1.32 13.81
std 0.17 0.11 0.02 0.13 0.37 0.70
min 0.00 0.00 0.00 15.75 0.60 11.36
max 0.93 0.46 0.11 16.38 2.42 15.41
Table 2: Statistics of minimum cost and fair cost and POF over 100 experiments with 5% capacity.
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Figure 5: Boxplot of the price of fairness with 10% capacity, with the different scenarios and the price
of fairness on the horizontal and vertical axes, respectively.
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low/hom low/het high/hom high/het mix/hom mix/het
Min-cost mean 7708.83 8069.41 7509.81 7524.81 7535.81 7524.44
std 22.24 90.82 3.45 5.26 6.70 5.80
min 7661 7857 7503 7514 7518 7511
max 7774 8294 7522 7538 7557 7542
Fair mean 7750.36 8872.97 7509.90 8751.89 7589.32 8780.72
std 25.92 17.68 3.48 1.39 14.12 12.84
min 7704 8833 7503 8750 7561 8733
max 7816 8934 7522 8756 7622 8815
POF mean 0.54 9.97 0.00 16.31 0.71 16.70
std 0.16 1.19 0.00 0.08 0.17 0.20
min 0.26 6.88 0.00 16.12 0.37 15.85
max 1.03 12.65 0.03 16.46 1.13 17.27
Table 3: Statistics of minimum cost and fair cost and POF over 100 experiments with 10% capacity.
The seeming discrepancy in the low/het scenario between the 5% and 10% capacity cases can
be explained by the structure of the low/het scenario. Because there are only low competition
companies in this scenario, all companies will bid on only a few jobs. When we set the capacity
for each time period to only 5% of those bids, it happens frequently that the capacity is set to an
extremely low number, i.e., 0 or 1. This means that there is not much leeway in the fair solution
for jobs to be reallocated. The fair solution is often similar to the minimum-cost solution as there
are only a few other possible allocations. This can also be observed in Table 2 where the means
of the costs of the minimum-cost and the fair solutions in the low/het scenario are similar but are
extremely high compared to those in the low/hom scenario.
By increasing the capacity to 10%, we allow more room for jobs to be reallocated. In Table
3 we can see that the difference in average cost between the low/het and low/hom scenarios in
the minimum-cost solution is significantly smaller than in the 5% capacity case. As there is more
room for reallocation, this eventually results in a higher price of fairness.
We can see that competition also has an influence on the price of fairness. Both high and
mixed competitions result in a higher price of fairness than low competition. We can see this in
the low/het, high/het, and mix/het scenarios in the 10% capacity case (average price of fairness:
9.97, 16.31, and 16.70 respectively). At first this may seem surprising. One would imagine that
having more possibilities for allocation will result in both the minimum-cost and fair solutions to
be closer to each other compared to when there are limited possibilities. However, this discrepancy
can be explained by looking at the minimum cost and fair cost of the solutions (see Table 3). We
can see that the cost for the minimum-cost solutions in the low/het scenario is on average higher
(8069.41) than that of the high/het (7524.81) and mix/het (7524.44) cases. This is due to the
limited possibilities if there are companies bidding only on a few jobs. However, the average cost
in the fair solutions in the low/het scenario (8872.97) is similar to that of the high/het (8751.89)
and mix/het (8780.72) scenarios. This results in a smaller difference between the minimum-cost
and fair solutions in the low/het scenario compared to the high/het and mix/het scenarios.
The mix/het scenario, where there is a mix of low- and high-competition companies, seems to
have a price of fairness similar to or lower than the high/het scenario (13.81 against 16.10 in the
5% capacity case, and 16.70 against 16.31 in the 10% capacity case). This is somewhat surprising
at first. Due to the presence of high-competition companies, it is clear that the minimum-cost
solutions would be similar to the solutions in the scenario with high competition because the
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more expensive low-competition companies are being ignored. However, one would expect that
the fair solutions will have higher costs because the more expensive low-competition companies
also need to be allocated jobs. For this we have to keep in mind that the degree of fairness is not
equal among the scenarios. It appears that due to the presence of low-competition companies,
which have fewer bids and therefore fewer allocation possibilities, they get fewer jobs allocated to
them even in the fair allocation. This in turn means that the other, high-competition companies
get allocated more jobs that are cheaper. In the end, this results in lower costs overall. This
effect can be seen clearly in the 5% capacity case. When we increase the possible capacity to
10%, low-competition companies get assigned more jobs, almost as many as the high-competition
companies. This results in higher costs.
Summary. All things considered, we can see that the price of fairness is fairly low when the
costs are homogeneous among companies. Jobs can be easily reallocated to make a more fair
allocation while keeping the total cost similar because the individual costs of a job for each
company are similar. In this case, fairness can be easily enforced without increasing the costs too
much or at all. When costs are heterogeneous however, we have to pay a higher price for fairness.
This is as expected because we would also need to allocate jobs to companies with high costs,
whereas we would only opt for companies with low costs in the minimum-cost solution. In the
case of low competition, allocations tend to have slightly higher costs because there is a limited
availability of jobs to be allocated to companies. This holds true for both the minimum-cost
and fair allocations. In the cases of high and mixed competitions, the costs of the minimum-cost
solutions are similar in the cases with homogeneous costs. This is as expected because only the
companies with the lowest costs get chosen while the ones with high costs are ignored. However,
when we enforce fairness, jobs will be forcibly reallocated to companies with high costs, which
might increase the total cost. The price of fairness is the highest in the high/het and mix/het
scenarios. Depending on the actual discrepancy between the different costs, one might opt out of
the idea of enforcing fairness when the price of fairness becomes too high.
5.3 Results: job distribution
Figures 6 and 7 show job distributions of both the minimum-cost and the fair solutions at one
instance for each scenario. We choose to show the job allocations of the instances in which the
highest POF was found because there were many cases with a POF of 0% in some scenarios. The
allocations are sorted in nondecreasing order so that they represent the fairness vector. We can see
that in all cases the fair job distribution is smoother than the minimum-cost distribution, which
is exactly what we desire.
For the low/hom and low/het scenarios in the 5% capacity case, we can see that the job
distributions in the minimum-cost and fair solutions do not differ much, with the exception of
a few companies getting one job more, or less. This further supports our claim that in these
scenarios it is often the case that the fair solution is similar to the minimum-cost solution because
there exists only a few feasible allocations.
In the high-competition scenarios (high/hom and high/het) for both the 5% and 10% capacity
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Figure 6: Job distributions in the minimum-cost and fair solutions for each scenario with 5% capacity,
sorted in ascending order by number of assigned jobs, with companies on the horizontal axis and the
number of assigned jobs on the vertical axis.
cases, we can see that the fair allocation assigns each company the same number of jobs. This is
possible because all companies have many bids, which results in much leeway while reallocating. In
the low- and mixed-competition scenarios we can see that due to the inclusion of low-competition
companies that do not bid on many jobs, it can still happen that certain companies get assigned
fewer jobs than others. This is due to capacity restrictions and to the fact that it is simply
not feasible for our proposed algorithm to assign more jobs to those companies. This effect can
therefore be seen to be more prominent when there is a lower capacity (5%).
In the homogeneous cost scenarios (low/hom, high/hom and mix/hom) of the 10% capacity
case, we can see that in the minimum-cost solution there are a few companies that do not get
assigned any jobs or are assigned only a few jobs. This is primarily due to their higher individual
costs compared to other companies. However, in the fair solution all companies are allocated
roughly the same number of jobs. A few companies will receive fewer jobs than others, but this is
due to capacity restrictions as explained above. Given that there are no or just minimal differences
between the costs of the minimum-cost and the fair solutions in the homogeneous cost scenarios,
the price of fairness when costs are homogeneous is minimal. This is as expected. Reallocating
jobs does not come at a significant price because the cost for a job is similar among all companies.
A similar effect can be seen in the homogeneous cost cases in the 5% capacity case. However, not
all companies get the same number of jobs due to capacity restrictions being more prominent.
With heterogeneous costs, the first 25 companies in the minimum-cost solution have been
allocated only a few jobs or even none at all because of the higher costs these companies have
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Figure 7: Job distributions in the minimum-cost and fair solutions for each scenario with 10% capacity,
sorted in ascending order by number of assigned jobs, with companies on the horizontal axis and the
number of assigned jobs on the vertical axis.
(except for the 5% capacity low/het scenario, which is due to capacity restrictions). However, in
the fair solution, these companies do get a significant number of jobs, although this comes with a
hefty POF, which can get up to as much as 17.27.
5.4 Results: varying number of jobs
We investigate the effect of the number of jobs on the price of fairness. We vary the number of jobs
from 50 to 500 while keeping the same number of companies of 50. For each scenario and number
of jobs we run 100 experiments and take the average price of fairness over these experiments. The
results are displayed in Figure 8.
We can see that for scenarios with homogeneous costs the price of fairness can be rather high
when the number of jobs is low, as much as 8.88 in the mix/hom scenario. This can be accredited
to the lack of flexibility in allocation when there is a small number of jobs. The distribution from
which the costs of jobs are drawn may be the same for all jobs, but there is still variation in the
costs. With a small number of jobs this variation plays a larger role when reassigning jobs from
the minimum-cost solution to a fair solution, especially when low-competition companies that bid
on only a few jobs are present. Even if low-competition companies had a high bid on a particular
job, if it is only one of the few jobs they bid on, the job needs to be allocated to these same
bidders in the fair solution. This raises the total cost in the fair solution. We notice this effect
particularly in the mix/hom scenario. A job that was assigned to a high-competition company
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Figure 8: Line charts of average POF over various numbers of jobs with 10% capacity, with the
number of available jobs in an experiment and the average price of fairness over 100 experiments on
the horizontal and vertical axes, respectively.
in the minimum-cost solution, where the lowest cost was chosen, can suddenly be assigned to a
low-competition company that only submitted a few bids.
As the number of jobs increases, the number of bids also increases, providing more flexibility
for reallocation when a fair solution needs to be constructed. There will be a bigger chance of
having a bid for the same job from another company with similar cost as the company in the
minimum-cost solution. The average price of fairness decreases when the number of jobs increases
and eventually the price of fairness seems to stabilize close to zero.
For scenarios with heterogeneous costs the effects are more complicated. Due to heterogeneous
costs, jobs that were allocated to cheap companies (ones that bid between 30 and 50) in the
minimum-cost solution need to be reallocated to expensive companies (ones that bid between 40
and 60) in the fair solution. This means an average increase of 10 in the cost per reallocated job.
When the number of jobs increases, the share of reallocated jobs increases as well, thus increasing
the total cost. This effect can be seen in particular in the low/het scenario, where the average
price of fairness increases as the number of jobs increases. In the high/het scenario this effect is
not as prominent, because there is high competition and thus there are many bids to choose from.
Then there is a substantial chance that there exists a bid from another company that is similar in
cost.
For the mix/het scenario, we have to keep in mind that high-competition companies have
bids between 30 and 50, whereas low-competition companies have bids between 40 and 60. This
means that when a job from a high-competition company in the minimum-cost solution needs to
be reassigned to a low-competition company in the fair solution (something that also happens
in the mix/hom scenario) the cost will increase by 10 on average. This results in a less steep
decline in the average price of fairness compared to the mix/hom scenario when gradually going
from 50 jobs to 200 jobs. The increase in costs resulting from reallocating jobs to companies with
completely different costs is especially noticeable when there are fewer jobs. This increase in costs
due to reallocation weighs more in the mix/het scenario than the effect of the average increase of
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Figure 9: Line charts of average POF over various numbers of companies with 10% capacity, with the
number of companies in an experiment and the average price of fairness over 100 experiments on the
horizontal and vertical axes, respectively.
10 when switching from a high-competition company to a low-competition one. The average price
of fairness is therefore declining in the mix/het scenario in contrast to the low/het and high/het
scenarios where the price of fairness increases with the increase in the number of jobs.
For all scenarios with heterogeneous costs it seems that the average price of fairness eventually
stabilizes as the number of jobs increases. This again can be accredited to the flexibility that
the increasing number of jobs, and therefore bids, introduces for reallocation when a fair solution
needs to be constructed. Reallocations become more efficient and will eventually weigh up against
the increase in costs due to the increased amount of reallocations.
5.5 Results: varying number of companies
In order to investigate the effect of the number of companies on the price of fairness we vary the
number of companies from 25 to 100 in increments of 25, while now fixing the number of jobs
to 250. For each scenario and number of companies we run 100 experiments and again take the
average price of fairness. The results are shown in Figure 9.
We notice that for the scenarios with homogeneous costs the price of fairness is rather low,
ranging from 0.00 to 1.48 in the mix/hom scenario. The addition of more companies does not
have much effect, as the costs are similar among all companies. This creates more flexibility for
the fair allocation. Only when the number of companies is low in the mix/hom scenario, there is
a slightly higher price of fairness due to lack of flexibility to allocate the jobs to companies with
similar costs in the fair allocation.
When we look at the scenarios with heterogeneous costs, we can see that for the high/het and
mix/het scenarios the price of fairness seems to decrease as more companies participate, which is
again due to added flexibility as the same number of jobs can be distributed among more companies
with many more bids. The seemingly odd occurrence of a slightly lower price of fairness at 25
companies compared to the case with 50 companies can be explained by the lack of competition.
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When we take a look at the actual costs of the minimum cost allocations, we can see that it is
slightly higher in the case of 25 companies than it is when there are 50 companies. Because of the
limited number of companies, there is not much competition between the bids. However, the costs
for the fair allocations with 25 companies is similar to those in the cases with more companies,
yielding a lower price of fairness.
The results of the low/het scenario stand out the most. It seems that the minimum cost and
the fair allocations have similar costs when there are 25 companies, having an average price of
fairness of 0.02. The price of fairness then increases substantially to 9.97 and 12.86 as the number
of companies increases to 50 and 75 companies, respectively. It decreases again to 12.08 when the
number of companies is further increased to 100. The average price of fairness of 0.02 with 25
companies can be easily explained when we take a look at the allocations. It seems that due to
the small number of bids with only 25 companies and low competition, the fair allocation is often
exactly the same as the minimum cost allocation. There is simply no other allocation possible. As
the number of companies increases, the number of bids also increases, adding more leeway for the
fair allocation. With 50 companies the number of bids seems to be sufficient in order to distribute
the jobs to companies evenly. However, the number of bids is still relatively low, resulting in the
costs of the minimum cost allocations to be much higher than in the case of 75 or 100 companies.
At the same time, the costs of the fair allocations gradually decrease as the number of companies
increases. The decrease in costs of the minimum cost allocations is much heftier than the decrease
in costs of the fair allocations, which results in the increase in price of fairness. Going from 75
to 100 companies the number of bids increases again, lowering the costs for the minimum cost
allocations slightly, while the costs for the fair allocations decrease more with the added bids. This
finally results in a slight drop in the price of fairness.
6 Conclusions and discussion
In task or job allocation problems there are many ways to assign jobs to all interested parties. The
most common way is to minimize the costs of such allocation by only considering the cheapest
companies. In this paper, instead of just focusing on costs, we take into account the job distribution
over companies. We try to allocate jobs to all participating parties as fairly as possible in terms of
the number of allocated jobs. This additional criterion is particularly relevant in our motivating
example, an inter-terminal transport problem (ITT) in the port of Rotterdam, where we want to
use the trucks already present at the port to execute inter-terminal transport jobs. Because such a
job allocation will be repeated daily, it is crucial to give those companies incentives to be involved
in this activity by assigning them jobs based not only on their costs but also on ensuring some
market share, i.e., allocated jobs.
To meet the new fairness criteria in task allocation, we developed a polynomial-time optimal
method consisting of two novel algorithms: IMaxFlow, which uses a progressive filling idea, and
FairMinCost, which smartly alters the structure of the problem. The output of these two algo-
rithms is a max-min fair task allocation with the least total cost. In the experiments we looked at
several scenarios for both the jobs that are being auctioned, and the companies who are bidding
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on the jobs. From the results of the experiments we find that in the situation where the costs
among companies are similar, implementing fair allocations comes with almost no extra cost for
the task owner. When the prices are highly volatile however, the auctioneer may need to pay
more for the fairness. When there are relatively few jobs, the price of fairness will usually be
relatively high due to the lack of flexibility in reallocating jobs. As the number of jobs increases,
the price of fairness will stabilize due to the flexibility granted by the increase in the number of
bids. Similarly, the more companies are participating, the more bids there will be, resulting in
more flexibility for reallocation and a lower price of fairness. However, the price of fairness can
also be low when there are only few companies. This is then mainly due to lack of flexibility for
reallocation, so that the fair allocation is similar to the minimum cost allocation. This means that
the number of participants should be sufficient in order to have the desired flexibility needed for
reallocation. The auctioneer should contemplate whether the fairness in the allocation is worth
the extra cost. It is necessary to investigate specific cases regarding the price of fairness.
We made certain assumptions in this work because we had a real case of the ITT problem
in the port of Rotterdam in mind. Some of these assumptions can be relaxed to some extent.
For instance, we assumed that each task can be completed within one time unit. If the tasks
have different durations, we can normalize them by using a time unit large enough to encompass
the task with the longest duration. We may lose some efficiency by doing this, but it makes
the problem solvable using our proposed algorithms. Furthermore, we assume that the tasks are
independent. One way to tackle interdependent tasks is to make them available in subsequent
time periods, i.e., make sure one task has been executed before the next one is made available for
execution.
The focus of this research is on designing efficient algorithms for finding fairest task alloca-
tions. Auctions are used in this research as a way to collect local information from the participants.
This information is then used as input in the task allocation problem. We do not consider the
bidding behaviour of the bidders in this paper. However, bidders may choose to misreport their
inputs in an attempt to affect the allocation in their favor. In order to incentivize the bidders
to bid truthfully, the mechanism design aspect of the auction needs to be studied as future re-
search (van der Krogt et al. 2008). In addition, we have only looked at one quantification of
fairness in this research, in which we only consider the number of tasks in an allocation. As we
have seen in the literature, there are many definitions of fairness and many different quantifications
of fairness (Ogryczak et al. 2008, Gonza´lez-Pacho´n and Romero 2016). When considering game
theoretical properties of the auction mechanism, another quantification of fairness might prove
to be better in attaining the desired properties. Investigating different quantifications of fairness
with mechanism design will be an interesting future direction.
In many real-world cases, the bids from one company can be combinatorial, that is, the cost of
receiving two jobs is strictly smaller than the total cost of executing the same two jobs separately.
If this combinatorial property exists between jobs, the task allocation problem becomes NP-
hard (Cramton et al. 2006). For example in the ITT problem, if one job is to transport some
goods from location A to B, and another job is to ship some goods from B to C, it seems that
giving both jobs to one company leads to smaller costs than letting two companies execute the
30
two jobs separately. After consulting with a port manager, we find out that the margin of these
two instances is so narrow that we gladly ignored the combinatorial property. The advantage of
this is that we now have a polynomial-time algorithm to compute the optimal allocation in terms
of fairness and cost. For the cases where the tasks have a high degree of complementarities our
proposed algorithms cannot be directly applied. Adapting our algorithms for solving such cases
is open for further research.
Even though our work has been inspired by the situation in the port of Rotterdam, the de-
scribed setting is not unique to this application. This work can be applied to many other task
allocation problems in which the centralized planner wants to enforce some kind of fairness among
the agents. Due to the rise of the so-called sharing economy (Goldman and Gorham 2006, Belk
2014), collaborative consumption in transport, for example car-sharing, has gained interest in the
past years. The main concern in this area is on where to station the shared-use vehicles (Fan et al.
2008, Shaheen et al. 2010, Kek et al. 2009). However, online platforms for collaborative consump-
tion in transport have recently been upcoming. In these platforms participants are free to join
or leave as they please. One might think of taxi services that are operated by civilians. Another
application would be in airport slot allocation. In this area, although not as dynamic as in the
cases of the port and taxi services, it is important to allocate slots to airlines both efficiently
and fair, as such to motivate new entrants (Castelli et al. 2011, Condorelli 2007). It would be
interesting to see whether our methods can be used in those applications.
A Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. IMaxFlow starts with capacity 0 for all company-sink edges and it adds only 1 more capacity
at each iteration. Thus, IMaxFlow takes at most maxk∈K(Nk) < J iterations, and in each iteration
there are at most K steps. In each step, a maximum flow algorithm is called. In our case, this is
the Edmonds-Karp algorithm, which runs in time O(|V | |A|2). The flow network G consists of at
most 2 (source and sink) +J + JT + TK +K nodes and at most J + JT + JTK + TK +K arcs.
This results in a running time of O(JK(JT + TK)(JKT )2) = O((J4K3T 3) + (J3K4T 3)).
B Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. The Goldberg-Tarjan algorithm is known to terminate after O(|V | |A|2 log(|V |)) iterations,
with Karp’s algorithm having a running time of O(|V | |A|). This results in a O(|V |2 |A|3 log(|V |))
algorithm for solving the second stage of the MFMCA problem. In G′ there are φK − φ1 < J
dummy layers. In each dummy layer the number of dummy jobs is upper bounded by K. The
number of vertices in each dummy layer is then at most 3K. This results in the number of vertices
being upper bounded by (JT +TK) for the original problem P and by JK for the dummy part of
problem P ′, for a total of JT + TK + JK. The number of arcs |A| is upper bounded by JTK for
P and by JK2 for the dummy part of problem P ′, for a total of JTK+JK2. Hence, FairMinCost
runs in time O(J3K3(K + T )3(JK + JT +KT )2 log(JK + JT +KT )).
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